A workload-adaptive mechanism for linear queries under local
  differential privacy by McKenna, Ryan et al.
A workload-adaptive mechanism for linear queries under
local differential privacy
Ryan McKenna Raj Kumar Maity Arya Mazumdar Gerome Miklau
College of Information and Computer Sciences
University of Massachusetts Amherst
{rmckenna, rajkmaity, arya, miklau}@cs.umass.edu
ABSTRACT
We propose a new mechanism to accurately answer a user-
provided set of linear counting queries under local differential
privacy (LDP). Given a set of linear counting queries (the
workload) our mechanism automatically adapts to provide
accuracy on the workload queries. We define a parametric
class of mechanisms that produce unbiased estimates of the
workload, and formulate a constrained optimization prob-
lem to select a mechanism from this class that minimizes
expected total squared error. We solve this optimization
problem numerically using projected gradient descent and
provide an efficient implementation that scales to large work-
loads. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our optimization-
based approach in a wide variety of settings, showing that it
outperforms many competitors, even outperforming existing
mechanisms on the workloads for which they were intended.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Differential Privacy [15] has emerged as the
dominant approach to privacy and its adoption in practical
settings is growing. Differential privacy is achieved with
carefully designed randomized algorithms, called mechanisms.
The aim of these mechanisms is to extract utility from the
data while adhering to the constraints imposed by differential
privacy. Utility is measured on a task-by-task basis, and
different tasks require different mechanisms. Utility-optimal
mechanisms, or mechanisms that maximize utility for a given
task under a fixed privacy budget, are still not known in
many cases.
There are two main models of differential privacy: the
central model and the local model. In the central model,
users provide their data to a trusted data curator, who runs a
privacy mechanism on the dataset in its entirety. In the local
model, users execute a privacy mechanism before sending it
to the data curator. Local differential privacy (LDP) offers a
stronger privacy guarantee than central differential privacy,
as it does not rely on the assumption of a trusted data
curator. For that reason, it has been embraced by several
organizations like Google [18], Apple [38], and Microsoft [14]
for the collection of personal data from customers. While the
stronger privacy guarantee is a benefit of the local model, it
necessarily leads to greater error than the central model [16],
which makes error-optimal mechanisms an important goal.
Our focus is answering a workload of linear counting queries
under local differential privacy. Answering a query workload
is a general task that subsumes other common tasks, like
estimating histograms, range queries, and marginals. Fur-
thermore, the expressivity of linear query workloads goes far
beyond these special cases, as it can include an arbitrary
set of predicate counting queries. By defining the work-
load, the analyst expresses the exact queries they care about
most, and their relative importance. There are several LDP
mechanisms for answering particular fixed workloads, like
histograms [1, 45, 5, 41], range queries [13, 42], and marginals
[12, 42]. These mechanisms were carefully crafted to provide
accuracy on the workloads for which they were designed, but
their accuracy properties typically do not transfer to other
workloads. Some LDP mechanisms are designed to answer
an arbitrary collection of linear queries [4, 17], but they do
not outperform simple baselines in practice.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism that auto-
matically adapts in order to prioritize accuracy on a target
workload. Adaptation to the workload is accomplished by
solving a numerical optimization problem, in which we search
over an expressive class of unbiased LDP mechanisms for
one that minimizes variance on the workload queries.
Workload-adaptation [21, 27, 33] is a much more devel-
oped topic in the central model of differential privacy and
has led to mechanisms that offer best-in-class error rates in
some settings [22]. Our work is conceptually similar to the
Matrix Mechanism [27, 33], which also minimizes variance
over a class of unbiased mechanisms. However, because the
class of mechanisms we consider is different, the optimiza-
tion problem is fundamentally different and requires a novel
analysis and algorithmic solution. We thoroughly discuss the
similarities and differences between these two mechanisms
in Section 7.
Contributions. The paper consists of four main technical
contributions.
• We propose a new class of mechanisms, called work-
load factorization mechanisms, that generalizes many
existing LDP mechanisms, and we formulate an opti-
mization problem to select a mechanism from this class
that is optimally tailored to a workload (Section 3).
• We give an efficient algorithm to approximately solve
this optimization problem, by reformulating it into an
algorithmically tractable form (Section 4).
• We provide a theoretical analysis which illuminates
error properties of the mechanism and justifies the
design choices we made (Section 5).
• In a comprehensive set of experiments we test our
mechanism on a range workloads, showing that it con-
sistently delivers lower error than competitors, by as
much as a factor of 14.6 (Section 6).
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2. BACKGROUNDAND PROBLEM SETUP
In this section we introduce notation for the input data
and query workload as well as provide basic definitions of
local differential privacy. A full review of notation is provided
in Table 2 of the Appendix.
2.1 Input Data and Workload
Given a domain U of n distinct user types ,the input data
is a collection of N users 〈u1, . . . , uN 〉, where each ui ∈ U .
We commonly use a vector representation of the input data,
containing a count for each possible user type:
Definition 2.1 (Data Vector) The data vector, denoted
by x, is an n-length vector of counts indexed by user types
u ∈ U such that:
xu =
N∑
j=1
1{uj = u} ∀u ∈ U .
In the local model, we do not have direct access to x, but it
is still useful to define it for the purpose of analysis. Below
is a simple data vector one might obtain from a data set of
student grades.
Example 2.2 (Student Data) Consider a data set of stu-
dent grades, where U = {A,B,C,D, F}. Suppose 10 students
got an A, 20 students got a B, 5 students got a C and no
students got a D or F . Then the data vector would be:
x =
[
10 20 5 0 0
]T
Linear counting queries have a similar vector representa-
tion, as shown in Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.3 (Linear Query) A linear counting query
is an n-length vector w indexed by user types u ∈ U , such
that the answer to the query is wTx =
∑
u∈U wuxu.
A workload is a collection p linear queries w1, . . . ,wp ∈ Rn
organized into a p× n matrix W. Our goal is to accurately
estimate answers to each workload query under local differ-
ential privacy, i.e., we want to privately estimate Wx.
The most commonly studied workload is the so-called
Histogram workload, which is represented by a n×n identity
matrix. A more interesting workload is given below:
Example 2.4 (Prefix workload) The prefix workload con-
tains queries that compute the (unnormalized) empirical cu-
mulative distribution function of the data, or the number of
students that have grades ≥ A,≥ B,≥ C,≥ D,≥ F .
W =

1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1

The workload W is an input to our algorithm, reflecting the
queries of interest to the analyst and therefore determining
the measure of utility that will be used to assess algorithm
performance. In this setup, we make no assumptions about
the structure or contents of W, and allow it to be completely
arbitrary, even including the same query multiple times or
multiple linearly dependent queries.
2.2 Local Differential Privacy
Local differential privacy (LDP) [16] is a property of a
randomized mechanism M that acts on user data. Instead
of reporting their true user type, users instead report a
randomized response obtained by executing M on their true
input. These randomized responses allow an analyst to
learn something about the population as a whole, while still
providing the individual users a form of plausible deniability
about their true input. The formal requirement on M is
stated in Definition 2.5.
Definition 2.5 (Local Differential Privacy) A random-
ized mechanism M : U → O is said to be -LDP if an only
if, for all u, u′ ∈ U and all S ⊆ O:
Pr[M(u) ∈ S] ≤ exp () Pr[M(u′) ∈ S]
The output range O can vary between mechanisms. In
some simple cases, it is the same as the input domain U ,
but it does not have to be. Choosing the output range is
typically the first step in designing a mechanism. When
the range of the mechanism is finite, i.e., |O| = m, we can
completely specify a mechanism by a so-called strategy matrix
Q ∈ Rm×n, indexed by (o, u) ∈ O × U . The mechanism
MQ(u) is then defined by:
Pr[MQ(u) = o] = Qo,u
This encoding of a mechanism essentially stores a proba-
bility for every possible input, output pair in the strategy
matrix Q. We translate Definition 2.5 to strategy matrices
in Proposition 2.6.
Proposition 2.6 (Strategy Matrix) The mechanismMQ
is -LDP if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Qo,u ≤ exp ()Qo,u′ , ∀ o, u, u′.
2. Qo,u ≥ 0,∀o, u , ∑oQo,u = 1,∀ u.
Above, the first condition is the privacy constraint, ensuring
that the output distributions for any two users are close, and
the second is the probability simplex constraint, ensuring
that each column of Q corresponds to a valid probability
distribution. Representing mechanisms as matrices is useful
because it allows us to reason about them mathematically
with linear algebra [26, 24]. Example 2.7 shows how a simple
mechanism, called randomized response1, can be encoded as
a strategy matrix.
Example 2.7 (Randomized Response) The randomized
response mechanism [44] can be encoded as a strategy matrix
in the following way:
Q =
1
e + n− 1

e 1 . . . 1
1 e . . . 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 . . . e

For this mechanism, the output range is the same as the
input domain, and hence the strategy matrix is square. The
diagonal entries of the strategy matrix are proportional to
e, and the off-diagonal entries are proportional to 1. This
1the name of this mechanism should not be confused with
the outputs of an arbitrary mechanism M, which we also
call randomized responses.
2
Mechanism Input Output Strategy Matrix
Randomized Response [44] u ∈ [n] o ∈ [n] Qo,u ∝
{
exp () o = u
1 o 6= u
RAPPOR [18] u ∈ [n] o ∈ {0, 1}n Qo,u ∝ exp
(

2
)n−‖o−eu‖1
Hadamard [1] u ∈ [n] o ∈ [K]
K = [2dlog2(n+1)e]
Qo,u ∝
{
exp () Ho+1,u = 1
1 Ho+1,u = −1
Subset Selection [45] u ∈ [n] o ∈ {0, 1}
n
‖o‖1 = d
Qo,u ∝
{
exp () ou = 1
1 ou = 0
Table 1: Existing LDP mechanisms encoded as a strategy matrix. eu is the one-hot encoding of u, H is the K ×K Hadamard
matrix, and d is a hyper-parameter.
means that each user reports their true input with proba-
bility proportional to e and all other possible outputs with
probability proportional to 1. It is easy to see that the con-
ditions of Proposition 2.6 are satisfied. While this is one of
the simplest mechanisms, many other mechanisms can also
be represented in this way.
For example, Table 1 shows how RAPPOR [18], Subset Se-
lection [45] and Hadamard [2] can be expressed as a strategy
matrix. Other mechanisms with more sophisticated struc-
ture, such as Hierarchical [13, 42] and Fourier [12], can also
be expressed as a strategy matrix, but they require too much
notation to explain in Table 1. A strategy matrix is simply
a direct encoding of a conditional probability distribution,
where every probability is explicitly enumerated as an entry
of the matrix. Hence, the representation can encode any
LDP mechanism, as long as the U and O are both finite and
the conditional probabilities can be calculated.
When executing the mechanism, each user reports a (ran-
domized) response oi =MQ(ui). When all users randomize
their data with the same mechanism, these responses are
typically aggregated into a response vector y ∈ Rm (indexed
by elements o ∈ O), where yo = ∑Nj=1 1{oj = o}. Much like
the data vector, the response vector is essentially a histogram
of responses, as it counts the number of users who reported
each response. In the sequel, it is useful to think of the
mechanism MQ as being a function from x to y instead of
ui to oi. Thus, for notational convenience, we overload the
definition of MQ, allowing it to consume a data vector and
return a response vector, so that MQ(x) = y.
The response vector y is often not that useful by itself,
but it can be used to estimate more useful quantities, such
as the data vector x or the workload answers Wx. This is
typically achieved with a post-processing step, and does not
impact the privacy guarantee of the mechanism.
3. THE FACTORIZATION MECHANISM
In this section, we describe our mechanism and the main
optimization problem that underlies it. We begin with a high-
level problem statement, and reason about it analytically
until it is in a form we can deal with algorithmically. We
present our key ideas and the main steps of our derivation,
but defer the finer details of the proofs to Appendix B.
Our goal is to find a mechanism that has low expected error
on the workload. This objective is formalized in Problem 3.1.
Problem 3.1 (Workload Error Minimization) Given a
workload W, design an -LDP mechanism M∗ that mini-
mizes worst-case expected L2 squared error. Formally,
M∗ = arg min
M
{
max
x
E[‖Wx−M(x)‖22]
}
In the problem statement above, our goal is to search through
the space of all -LDP mechanisms for the one that is best
for the given workload. Because it is difficult to characterize
an arbitrary mechanismM in a way that makes optimization
possible, we do not solve the above problem in its full gener-
ality. Instead, we perform the search over a restricted class of
mechanisms which is easier to characterize. While somewhat
restricted, this class of mechanisms is quite expressive, and
it captures many of the state-of-the-art LDP mechanisms
available today [18, 45, 2, 12, 13, 42].
Definition 3.2 (Workload Factorization Mechanism)
Given an -LDP strategy matrix Q ∈ Rm×n and a reconstruc-
tion matrix V ∈ Rp×m such that W = VQ, the Workload
Factorization Mechanism (factorization mechanism for short)
is defined as:
MV,Q(x) = VMQ(x)
Note thatMV,Q is defined in terms ofMQ, and it is param-
eterized by an additional reconstruction matrix V as well.
This reconstruction matrix is used to estimate the workload
query answers from the response vector output by MQ. In
fact, the workload query estimates produced by this class of
mechanisms is unbiased, as:
E[MV,Q(x)] = VE[MQ(x)] = VQx = Wx.
Furthermore, MV,Q inherits the privacy guarantee of MQ
by the post-processing principle of differential privacy [16].
Remark 1 (Consistency) Because these mechanisms are
unbiased, they will produce the correct workload answers in
expectation. However, the individual estimates produced by
the mechanism may not be the true workload answers for
any underlying dataset, which is a consistency problem. For
example, the estimates might suggest that one or more entries
of the data vector are negative, which is clearly impossible. To
address this problem we show our mechanism can be improved
through a post-processing technique that produces consistent
estimates to the workload queries that are as close as possible
to the unbiased estimates. This idea is not new, but an
adaptation of existing techniques [35, 30], so we defer the full
description to the appendix. We nevertheless demonstrate its
benefits experimentally in Section 6.7.
We consider this an extension of our mechanism that can
improve utility in practice, and evaluate it in isolation. For
the remainder of the paper, we will focus on the original,
unbiased mechanism, as it is substantially easier to reason
about analytically.
Many existing LDP mechanisms can be represented as a
factorization mechanism. For example, we show how the
3
Randomized Response mechanism can be expressed as a
factorization mechanism in Example 3.3.
Example 3.3 (Randomized Response) The randomized
response mechanism uses Q as defined in Example 2.7 and
V = Q−1 to estimate the Histogram workload (W = I).
V =
1
e − 1

e + n− 2 −1 . . . −1
−1 e + n− 2 . . . −1
...
...
. . .
...
−1 −1 . . . e + n− 2

While the randomized response mechanism is intended to
be used to answer the Histogram workload, there is no reason
why it cannot be used for other workloads as well. In fact,
it is quite straightforward to see how it can be extended to
answer an arbitrary workload, simply by using V = WQ−1.
3.1 Variance Derivation
While the factorization mechanism is unbiased for any
workload factorization, different factorizations lead to dif-
ferent amounts of variance on the workload answers. This
creates the opportunity to choose the workload factorization
that leads to the lowest possible total variance. In order to
do that, we need an analytic expression for the total variance
in terms of V and Q, which we derive in Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 3.4 (Variance) The expected total squared error
(total variance) of a workload factorization mechanism is:
E[‖Wx−MV,Q(x)‖22] =
∑
u∈U
xu
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − (vTi qu)2
where qu denotes column u of Q and v
T
i denotes row i of V.
Notice above that the exact expression for variance depends
on the data vector x, which we do not have access to, as it
is a private quantity. We want our mechanism to work well
for all possible x, so we consider worst-case variance and a
relaxation average-case variance instead.2
Corollary 3.5 (Worst-case variance) The worst-case vari-
ance of MV,Q occurs when all users have the same worst
case type (i.e., xu = N for some u), and is:
Lworst(V,Q) = N max
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − (vTi qu)2.
Corollary 3.6 (Average-case variance) The average-case
variance of MV,Q occurs when xu = Nn for all u and is:
Lavg(V,Q) =
N
n
∑
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − (vTi qu)2.
With these analytic expressions for variance, we can ana-
lyze and compare existing mechanisms that can be expressed
as a workload factorization mechanism. The variance for
randomized response is shown in Example 3.7.
Example 3.7 (Variance of Randomized Response) The
worst-case and average-case variance of the factorization in
Example 3.3 on the Histogram workload is:
Lworst(V,Q) = Lavg(V,Q) = N(n−1)
[ n
(e − 1)2 +
2
e − 1
]
2Alternatively, if we had a prior distribution over x, we could
use that to estimate variance.
The expression above is obtained by simply plugging in V
and Q to the equations above and simplifying. Interestingly,
the worst-case and average-case variance are the same for this
workload factorization due to the symmetry in the workload
and strategy matrices.
3.2 Strategy Optimization
With an analytic expression for variance, we can state
the optimization problem underlying the factorization mech-
anism. Our goal is to find a workload factorization that
minimizes the total variance on the workload. To do that,
we set up an optimization problem, using total variance as
the objective function while taking into consideration the
constraints that have to hold on V and Q. This is formalized
in Problem 3.8.
Problem 3.8 (Optimal Factorization) Given a workload
W and a privacy budget :
minimize
V,Q
L(V,Q)
subject to W = VQ∑
oQo,u = 1 ∀u
0 ≤ Qo,u ≤ exp ()Qo,u′ ∀o, u, u′.
Above, L is a loss function that captures how good a given
factorization is, such as the worst-case variance Lworst or the
average-case variance Lavg. While our original objective in
Problem 3.1 was to find the mechanism that optimizes worst-
case variance, for practical reasons we use the average-case
variance instead. The average-case variance is a smooth ap-
proximation of the worst-case variance, which leads to a more
analytically and computationally tractable problem. Addi-
tionally, the smoothness of the average-case variance makes
the corresponding optimization problem more amenable to
numerical methods. We study the ramifications of this re-
laxation theoretically in Section 5.1.When using Lavg as
the objective function, we observe it can be expressed in
a much simpler form using matrix operations, as shown in
Theorem 3.9.
Theorem 3.9 (Objective Function) The objective func-
tion L(V,Q) = tr[VDQV
T ] is related to Lavg(V,Q) by:
Lavg(V,Q) =
N
n
(
L(V,Q)− ‖W‖2F
)
,
where DQ = Diag(Q1) and tr[·] is the trace of a matrix.
From now on, when we refer to L(V,Q), we are referring to
its definition in Theorem 3.9. The new objective is equivalent
to Lavg up to constant factors, and hence can be used in
place of it for the purposes of optimization.
With this simplified objective function, we observe that
for a fixed strategy matrix Q, we can compute the optimal
V in closed form. If the entries of the response vector were
statistically independent and had equal variance, then this
would simply be V = WQ†, where Q† is the Moore-Penrose
pseudo-inverse of Q [11, 23]. However, since the entries
of the response vector have unequal variance and are not
statistically independent in general, this simple expression
is not correct. We can still express the optimal V in closed
form, however, as shown in Theorem 3.10.
Theorem 3.10 (Optimal V for fixed Q) For a fixed Q,
the minimizer of L(V,Q) subject to W = VQ is given by:
V = W(QTD−1Q Q)
†QTD−1Q ,
4
Note that we can assume DQ is invertible without loss
of generality. If it were not, then one entry of the diagonal
would have to be 0, implying that a row of Q is all zero. Such
a row corresponds to an output that never occurs under the
privacy mechanism, and can be removed without changing
the mechanism. Further note that for the above formula to
apply, there must exist a V such that W = VQ, which is
guaranteed if and only if W is in the row space of Q [37].
Expressed as a constraint, this is W = WQ†Q.
Now that we know the optimal V for any Q, we can plug
it into L(V,Q) to express the objective as a function of Q
alone. Doing this, and simplifying further, leads to our final
optimization objective, stated in Theorem 3.11.
Theorem 3.11 (Objective Function for Q) The objec-
tive function can be expressed as:
L(Q) = tr[(QTD−1Q Q)
†(WTW)].
L(Q) is our final optimization objective. We are almost
ready to restate the optimization problem in terms of Q.
However, before we do that, it is useful to simplify the
constraints of the problem. The constraints stated in Prob-
lem 3.8 are challenging to deal with algorithmically because
there are a large number of them. Ignoring the factorization
constraint, there are n2m + n constraints on Q, and each
entry of Q is constrained by entries from the same column
and entries from the same row.
By introducing an auxiliary optimization variable z ∈ Rm,
we reduce this to nm+n constraints, so that each entry of Q
is only constrained by entries from the same column and z.
Specifically, z corresponds to the minimum allowable value
on each row of Q, and every column of Q must be between
z and exp ()z (coordinate-wise inequality). It is clear that
this is exactly equivalent to Condition 2 in Proposition 2.6.
Also note that Condition 1 can be expressed in matrix form
as QT1 = 1. The final optimization problem underlying the
workload factorization mechanism is stated in Problem 3.12.
Problem 3.12 (Strategy Optimization) Given a work-
load W and a privacy budget :
minimize
Q,z
tr[(QTD−1Q Q)
†(WTW)]
subject to W = WQ†Q
QT1 = 1
0 ≤ z ≤ qu ≤ exp ()z ∀u.
4. OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM
We now discuss our approach to solving Problem 3.12. It
is a nonlinear optimization problem with linear and nonlinear
constraints. While the objective is smooth (and hence differ-
entiable) within the boundary of the constraint W = WQ†Q,
it is not convex. It is typically infeasible to find a closed
form solution to such a problem, and conventional numerical
optimization methods are not guaranteed to converge to a
global minimum for non-convex objectives. However, such
numerical gradient-based methods have seen remarkable em-
pirical success in a variety of domains, often finding high
quality local minima. That is the approach we take, however,
rather than use an out-of-the-box commercial solver, which
would not be able to scale to larger problem sizes, we pro-
vide our own optimization algorithm which achieves greater
scalability by exploiting structure in the constraint set.
Algorithm 1 Projection onto bounded probability simplex
Input: r, z ∈ Rm, 
. sorted vector and corresponding permutation
u,pi = sort([z− r, exp ()z− r])
a =
[
(−1)1[pii≤m]]
i=1...2m
b =
[∑i−1
j=1 aj
]
i=1...2m
ρ = min{1 ≤ i ≤ 2m : 1T z + biui +∑i−1j=1 ajuj > 1}
λ = (1− 1T z− bρuρ −∑ρ−1j=1 ajuj)/bρ + uρ
return clip(r + λ, z, exp ()z)
The algorithm we propose is an instance of projected gra-
dient descent [36], a variant of gradient descent that handles
constraints. To implement this algorithm, the key challenge
is to project onto the constraint set. In other words, given
a matrix R that does not satisfy the constraints, find the
“closest” matrix Q that does satisfy the constraints. Ignoring
the constraint W = WQ†Q for now, this sub-problem is
stated formally in Problem 4.1.
Problem 4.1 (Projection onto LDP Constraints) Given
an arbitrary matrix R, a vector z, and a privacy budget , the
projection onto the privacy constraint, denoted Q = Πz,(R)
is obtained by solving the following problem:
minimize
Q
‖Q−R‖2F
subject to QT1 = 1
z ≤ qu ≤ exp ()z ∀u.
Problem 4.1 is easier to solve than Problem 3.12 because
the objective is now a quadratic function of Q. In addition,
a key insight to solve this problem efficiently is to notice
that it is closely related to the problem of projecting onto
the probability simplex [43] (now with bound constraints),
and admits a similar solution. Specifically, the form of the
solution is stated in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2 (Projection Algorithm) The solution
to Problem 4.1 may be obtained one column at a time using
qu = clip(ru + λu, z, exp ()z),
where clip “clips” the entries of ru+λu to the range [z, exp ()z]
entry-wise and λu is a scalar value that makes 1
Tqu = 1.
The solution is remarkably simple. Intuitively, we add
the same scalar value to every entry of ru then clip those
values that lie outside the allowed range. The scalar value
λu is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint 1
Tqu = 1,
and is chosen so that qu satisfies the constraint. It may be
calculated through binary search or any other method to find
the root of the function 1Tqu − 1 = 0. We give an efficient
O(m log (m)) algorithm to find λu and qu in Algorithm 1.
Now that we have discussed the projection problem and
its solution, we are ready to state the full projected gradient
descent algorithm for finding an optimized strategy. Algo-
rithm 2 is an iterative algorithm, where in each iteration
we perform a gradient descent plus projection step on the
optimization parameters z and Q. The gradient ∇QL is
easily obtained as L is a function of Q, but the gradient
term ∇zL is less obvious. However, by observing that Q is
actually a function of z (from the projection step Πz,), we
can use the multi-variate chain rule to back-propagate the
5
Algorithm 2 Strategy optimization
Input: Workload W ∈ Rp×n, privacy budget 
Intialize Q ∈ Rm×n, z ∈ Rm, β ∈ R+
α = β/n exp ()
for t = 1, . . . , T do
z← clip(z− α∇zL(Q),0,1)
Q← Πz,(Q− β∇QL(Q))
end for
return Q
gradient from Q to z to obtain ∇zL. We do not discuss the
details of computing the gradients here, as it can be easily
accomplished with automatic differentiation tools [20, 32].
We note that Algorithm 2 handles the constraint W =
WQ†Q “for free” in the sense that we do not need to deal
with it explicitly, as long as the step sizes and initialization
are chosen appropriately. Specifically, as long as the initial
Q satisfies the constraint, and the step sizes are sufficiently
small, every subsequent Q in the algorithm will also satisfy
the constraint. Intuitively, this is because as we move closer
to the boundary of the constraint, the objective function
blows up and eventually reaches a point of discontinuity when
the constraint is not satisfied. Because we update using the
negative gradient, which is a descent direction, we will never
approach the boundary of the constraint. We discuss the
choice of step size and initialization below. This trick is a
very nice way to deal with a constraint that is otherwise
challenging to deal with. We note that similar ideas have
been used to deal with related constraints in prior work [46].
The step size for the gradient descent step must be supplied
as input, and two different step sizes are used to update Q
and z. Notice that we take a smaller step size to update z
than Q. This is a heuristic we use to make sure z doesn’t
change too fast; it improves the robustness of the algorithm.
We perform a hyper-parameter search to find a step size that
works well, only running the algorithm for a few iterations in
this phase, then running it longer once a step size is chosen.
Decaying the step size at each iteration is also possible, as
smaller step sizes typically work better in later iterations.
The final missing piece in Algorithm 2 is the initialization
of Q, for which there are multiple options. One option is to
initialize with the strategy matrix from an existing mecha-
nism, such as the best one from Table 1. Then intuitively the
optimized strategy will never be worse than the other mech-
anisms, because the negative gradient is a descent direction.
This is an informal argument, as it is technically possible
that the optimized strategy has better average-case variance
but worse worst-case variance than the initial strategy. We
do not take this approach, however, as we find initializing
Q randomly tends to work better. Specifically, we let R be
a random 4n× n matrix, where each entry is sampled from
U [0, 1]. Then we obtain Q by projecting onto the constraint
set; i.e., Q = Πz,(R), where z =
1+e−
8n
1, where 1 is a
vector of ones. The choice of m is also an important consid-
eration when initializing Q. While larger m leads to a more
expressive strategy space, it also leads to more expensive
optimization. Our choice of m = 4n represents a sweet spot
that we found works well empirically across a variety of work-
loads. In general, a hyper-parameter search can be executed
to find the best m. This hyper-parameter search does not
degrade the privacy guarantee in any way because we can
evaluate the quality of a strategy without consuming the
privacy budget, by using the analytic formulas for variance.
It requires O(n2m + n3) time to evaluate the objective
function and its gradient (assuming WTW has been pre-
computed) and O(nm logm) time to perform the projection.
Thus, the per-iteration time complexity of Algorithm 2 is
O(n2m+ n3 + nm logm), or O(n3) when using m = 4n.
5. THEORETICAL RESULTS
In this section, we answer several theoretical questions
about our mechanism. First, we justify the relaxation in the
objective function, used to make the optimization analyti-
cally tractable. Second, we theoretically analyze the error
achieved by our mechanism, measured in terms of sample
complexity. Third, we derive lower bounds on the achievable
error of workload factorization mechanisms. All the proofs
are deferred to Appendix B.
5.1 Relaxed Objective
In Section 3 we replaced our true optimization objective
Lworst with a relaxation Lavg. In this section, we justify that
choice theoretically, showing that Lworst is tightly bounded
above and below by Lavg.
Theorem 5.1 (Bounds on Lworst) Let W = VQ be an
arbitrary factorization of W where Q is an -LDP strategy
matrix. Then the worst case variance Lworst(V,Q) and
average-case variance Lavg(V,Q) are related as follows:
Lavg(V,Q) ≤ Lworst(V,Q) ≤ e
(
Lavg(V,Q) +
N
n
||W||2F
)
Theorem 5.1 suggests that relaxing Lworst to Lavg does not
significantly impact the optimization problem. Intuitively,
this theorem holds because of the privacy constraint on Q,
which guarantees that the column of Q for the worst-case
user cannot be too different from any other column. Hence,
all users must have a similar impact on the total variance of
the mechanism. Empirically, we find that Lworst is often even
closer to Lavg than the upper bound suggests. Furthermore,
in some cases Lworst is exactly equal to Lavg, as we showed
in Example 3.7.
5.2 Sample complexity
We gave an analytic expression for the expected total
squared error (total variance) of our mechanism in Corol-
lary 3.5. However, this quantity might be difficult to inter-
pret, and it is more natural to look at the number of samples
needed to achieve a fixed error instead. Furthermore, when
running an LDP mechanism it is important to know how
much data is required to obtain a target error rate, as that
information is critical for determining an appropriate privacy
budget.
Because the total variance increases with the number of
individuals N and the number of workload queries m, we
instead look at a normalized measure of variance.
Definition 5.2 (Normalized Variance) The normalized
worst-case variance of MV,Q is:
Lnorm(V,Q) = max
x
E
[ 1
m
∥∥∥∥ 1N {Wx−MV,Q(x)}
∥∥∥∥2
2
]
Lnorm is the same as Lworst up to constant factors, al-
though it is more interpretable because it is a measure of
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variance on a single “average” workload query, where variance
is measured on the normalized data vector x/N .
Corollary 5.3 (Normalized Variance) The normalized
variance is:
Lnorm(V,Q) =
1
mN2
Lworst(V,Q)
=
1
mN
max
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − (vTi qu)2
Interestingly, the dependence on N does not change with V
and Q — it is always Θ( 1
N
), but the constant factor depends
on the quality of the workload factorization.
Corollary 5.4 (Sample Complexity) The number of sam-
ples needed to achieve normalized variance α is:
N ≥ 1
mα
max
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − (vTi qu)2
We can readily compute the sample complexity numerically
for any factorization VQ. In fact, the sample complexity
and worst-case variance of a mechanism are proportional, as
evident from the above equation. Additionally, by replacing
Lworst(V,Q) with a lower bound, we can get an analytical
expression for the sample complexity in terms of the privacy
budget  and the properties of the workload W.
Example 5.5 (Sample complexity, Randomized Response)
The Randomized Response mechanism described in Exam-
ple 3.3 has sample complexity:
N ≥ (n− 1)
αn
[ n
(e − 1)2 +
2
e − 1
]
on the Histogram workload.
Example 5.5 suggests the sample complexity of the ran-
domized response mechanism grows roughly at a linear rate
with the domain size n.
5.3 Lower Bound
For a given workload, a theoretical lower bound on the
achievable error is useful for checking how close to optimal
our strategies are. It also can be used to characterize the
inherent difficulty of the workload. In this section, we derive
an easily-computable lower bound on the achievable error
under our mechanism in terms of the singular values of the
workload matrix.
Theorem 5.6 (Lower Bound, Factorization Mechanism)
Let W be a workload matrix and let Q be any -LDP strategy
matrix. Then we have:
1
exp ()
(λ1 + · · ·+ λn)2 ≤ L(Q)
where λ1, . . . , λn are the singular values of W and L(Q) is
the loss function defined in Theorem 3.11.
This result is similar to lower bounds known to hold in the
central model of differential privacy, based on the analysis of
the Matrix Mechanism [29]. In both cases the hardness of a
workload is characterized by its singular values.
Other lower bounds for this problem have characterized
the hardness of a workload in terms of quantities like the
largest L2 column norm of W [4], the so-called factorization
norm of W [17], and the so-called packing number associated
with W [9]. While interesting theoretically, the factorization
norm and packing number are hard to calculate in practice.
In contrast, our bound can be easily calculated.
Theorem 5.6 gives a lower bound on our optimization
objective. Translating that back to worst-case variance gives
us Corollary 5.7.
Corollary 5.7 (Worst-case variance) The worst-case vari-
ance of any factorization mechanism must be at least:
N
n exp ()
(λ1 + · · ·+ λn)2 − N
n
‖W‖2F ≤ Lworst(V,Q)
Combining Corollary 5.7 with Corollary 5.4 and applying
it to the Histogram workload gives us a lower bound on the
sample complexity.
Example 5.8 (Lower Bound for Histogram Workload)
Every workload factorization mechanism requires at least
1
α
(
1
exp ()
− 1
n
) samples to achieve normalized variance α on
the Histogram workload.
Note the very weak dependence on n in Example 5.8, which
suggests that the sample complexity should not change much
with n. Further, recall from Example 5.5 that the sample
complexity of randomized response is linear in n. This
suggests randomized response is not the best mechanism for
the Histogram workload. This result is not new, as there are
several mechanisms that are known to perform better than
randomized response [1, 45, 41, 18]. We show empirically
in Section 6 that some of these mechanisms achieve the
optimal sample complexity for the Histogram workload up to
constant factors (i.e., no dependence on n). Our mechanism
also achieves the optimal sample complexity for this workload,
but has better constant factors.
For other workloads, the sample complexity may depend on
n. Calculating the exact dependence on n for other workloads
requires deriving the singular values of the workload as a
function of n in closed form, which may be challenging for
workloads with complicated structure.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we experimentally evaluate our mecha-
nism. We extensively study the utility of our mechanism
on a variety of workloads, domains, and privacy levels, and
compare it against multiple competing mechanisms from
the literature. We demonstrate consistent improvements in
utility compared to other mechanisms in all settings (Sec-
tion 6.2 and Section 6.3 and Section 6.4). We also study the
robustness and scalability of our optimization algorithm
(Section 6.5 and Section 6.6). The source code for our
mechanism, and other mechanisms represented as a strategy
matrix, is available at https://github.com/ryan112358/
workload-factorization-mechanism.
6.1 Experimental setup
Workloads. We consider six different workloads in our em-
pirical analysis, each of which can be defined for a specified
domain size. These workloads are intended to capture com-
mon queries an analyst might want to perform on data and
have been studied previously in the privacy literature. These
workloads are Histogram, Prefix, All Range, All Marginals,
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Figure 1: Sample complexity of 7 algorithms on 6 workloads for  ∈ [0.5, 4.0]
3-Way Marginals, and Parity. Histogram is the simplest work-
load, studied as a running example throughout the paper,
and encoded as an identity matrix. Prefix was introduced
in Example 2.4, and includes a set of range queries required
to compute the empirical CDF over a 1-dimensional domain.
All Range is a workload containing all range queries over a
1-dimensional domain, studied in [12]. All Marginals and 3-
Way Marginals contain queries to compute the marginals over
a multidimensional binary domain, and were studied in [13].
Parity also contains queries defined over a multidimensional
binary domain, and was studied in [19].
Mechanisms. We compare our mechanism against six other
state-of-the-art mechanisms, including Randomized Response
[44], Hadamard [2], Hierarchical [13, 42], Fourier [12], and
the Matrix Mechanism [27, 17] (both L1 and L2 versions).
While the Matrix Mechanism is typically thought of as a
technique for central differential privacy, it has been studied
theoretically as a mechanism for local differential privacy as
well [17]. This version of the “distributed” Matrix Mechanism
is what we compare against in experiments.
The first four mechanisms are all particular instances of
the class of factorization mechanisms, just with different
factorizations. They were all designed to answer a fixed
workload (e.g., Randomized Response was designed for the
Histogram workload), but they can still be run on other
workloads with minor modifications. In particular, for each
mechanism we use the same Q across different workloads,
but change V based on the workload, using Theorem 3.10.
We omit from comparison the Gaussian mechanism [4],
as it is strictly dominated by the L2 Matrix Mechanism.
We also omit from comparison RAPPOR [18] and Subset
Selection [45], as they require exponential space to represent
the strategy matrix, making it prohibitive to calculate worst-
case variance and sample complexity. However, we note
that these mechanisms have been previously compared with
Hadamard, and shown to offer comparable performance on
the Histogram workload [2].
Evaluation. Our primary evaluation metric for comparing
algorithms is sample complexity, which we calculate exactly
using Corollary 5.4 with α = 0.01. Recall that the sample
complexity is proportional to the worst-case variance, but is
appropriately normalized and easier to interpret. Further-
more, we remark that for most experiments in this section, no
input data is required, as the sample complexities we report
apply for the worst-case dataset. In practice, we have found
that the variance on real world datasets is quite close to the
worst-case variance, as we demonstrate in Section 6.4. We
also vary the privacy budget  and domain size n, studying
their impact on the sample complexity for each mechanism
and workload.
6.2 Impact of Epsilon
Figure 1 shows the relationship between workload and 
on the sample complexity for each mechanism. We consider
 ranging from 0.5 to 4.0, fixing n to be 512. These privacy
budgets are common in practical deployments of differential
privacy, and local differential privacy in particular [41, 14,
18]. We state our main findings below:
• Our mechanism (labeled Optimized) is consistently the
best in all settings: it requires fewer samples than every
other mechanism on every workload and  we tested.
• The magnitude of improvement over the best competitor
varies between 1.0 (Histogram,  = 0.5) and 14.6 (All
Range,  = 4.0), but the improvement is typically around
2.5 in the medium privacy regime. In the very high-privacy
regime with   0.5, our mechanism is typically quite
close to the best competitor, and in the very low-privacy
regime with  4.0, our mechanism matches randomized
response, which is optimal in that regime. The reduction
of required samples translates to a context that really
matters: data collectors can now run their analyses on
smaller samples to achieve their desired accuracy.
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Figure 2: Sample complexity of 7 algorithms on 6 workloads for n ∈ [8, 1024]
• The best competitor changes with the workload and .
For example, the best competitor on the Prefix workload
was Hierarchical, while the best competitor on the 3-Way
Marginals workload was Fourier. In both cases, these
mechanisms were specifically designed to offer low error
on their respective workloads, but they don’t work as well
on other workloads. Additionally, Randomized Response
is often the best mechanism at high , so even for a fixed
workload, the best competitor is not always the same. On
the other hand, our mechanism adapts effectively to the
workload and , and works well in all settings. As a result,
only one algorithm needs to be implemented, rather than
an entire library of algorithms, and, accordingly it is not
necessary to select among alternative algorithms.
• Some workloads are inherently harder to answer than
others: the number of samples required by our mechanism
differs by up to two orders of magnitude between workloads.
The easiest workload appears to be Histogram, while the
hardest is Parity. This is consistent with the lower bound
we gave in Theorem 5.6, which characterizes the hardness
of the workload in terms of its singular values – the bound
is much lower for Histogram than for Parity.
6.3 Impact of Domain Size
Figure 2 shows the relationship between workload and n
on the sample complexity for each mechanism. We consider
n ranging from 8 to 1024, fixing  to be 1.0. We state our
main findings below:
• For the Histogram workload, there is almost no dependence
on the domain size for every mechanism except randomized
response. This is consistent with our finding in Example 5.8
regarding the lower bound on sample complexity. This
observation is unique to the Histogram workload, however.
• The mechanisms that were designed for a given workload,
and those that adapt to the workload, have a better de-
pendence on the domain size (smaller slope) than the
mechanisms that do not. This includes the L2 Matrix
Mechanism, which is worse than every other mechanism in
most settings, but slowly overtakes the other mechanisms
for large domain sizes.
• The sample complexity of our mechanism and other mech-
anisms tailored to the workload is generally O(
√
n), as the
slope of the lines are ≈ 0.5 in log space. 3 On the other
hand, the sample complexity of the mechanisms not tai-
lored to the workload is more like O(n) (as the slope of the
line is ≈ 1.0). These findings are quite interesting: they
suggest the improvements offered by workload adaptivity
are more than just a constant factor, they grow with the
domain size.
6.4 Impact of Dataset
Whereas results in previous sections focused on worst-case
sample complexity, we now turn our attention to sample
complexity on real-world benchmark datasets obtained from
the DPBench study [22]. To calculate the sample complexity
on real data, we simply replace Lworst in Corollary 5.4 with
the exact (data-dependent) expression for total variance
stated in Theorem 3.4.
In Figure 3a, we plot the sample complexity of each mech-
anism on three datasets for each mechanism on the Prefix
workload, fixing n = 512 and  = 1.0. We also plot the worst-
case sample complexity for reference. As expected, our mech-
anism still outperforms all others on each dataset. In fact, all
mechanisms performed pretty consistently, offering similar
sample complexities for each dataset. The largest deviation
between datasets occurs for the Hadamard mechanism, where
it needs 1.69× more samples for the NETTRACE dataset
than for the HEPTH dataset. The Optimized mechanism is
even more consistent, as the largest deviation is only 1.006×.
Additionally, the real-world sample complexity is very well-
approximated by the worst-case sample complexity for the
3the slope of a line in log space corresponds to the power of
a polynomial in linear space; i.e., log y = m log x→ y = xm.
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Figure 3: (a) Sample complexity on benchmark datasets for Prefix workload. (b) Worst-case variance (ratio to best found) of
optimized strategy for various m. (c) Per-iteration time complexity of optimization for increasing domain sizes.
Optimized mechanism, as the maximum deviation is only
1.009×. This suggests the conclusions drawn based on worst-
case sample complexity in Figure 1 and Figure 2 hold for
real-world data as well. Although not shown, we repeated
this experiment for other workloads and settings and made
similar observations.
6.5 Initialization
Recall that our optimization algorithm is initialized with a
random strategy matrix, and that different initial strategies
can lead to different optimized strategies. In this section, we
aim to understand how sensitive our optimization algorithm
is to the different initializations, and whether it depends on
m, the number of rows in the strategy matrix.
We fix n = 64 and  = 1.0, and vary m from 2n to 16n. For
each m, we compute 10 optimized strategies with different
random initializations and record the worst-case variance for
each strategy. In order to plot all workloads on the same
figure, we normalize the worst-case variance to the best found
across all trials. In Figure 3b, we plot the median variance
ratio for each m as well as an error bar to indicate the min
and max ratio obtained across the 10 trials. We observe that
the optimization is quite robust to the initialization, and
produces pretty consistent results between runs, as evident
by the small error bars. Furthermore, the optimization is not
very sensitive to the choice of m, as all optimized strategies
are within a factor of 1.21 to the best found. Strategies tend
to get closer to optimal for larger m, and eventually level
off, with the exception of the Parity workload. We suspect
this difference is due to the fact that Parity is a low-rank
workload, and doesn’t require a large strategy. Using m = 4n
as we did in other experiments tends to produce strategies
within a factor of 1.05 to 1.1 of the best found. With enough
computational time and resources, we recommend using a
hyper-parameter search to find the best m, as this extra 10%
improvement is meaningful in practice.
6.6 Scalability of Optimization
We measure the scalability of optimization by looking at
the per-iteration time complexity. In each iteration, we must
evaluate the objective function (and its gradient) stated in
Theorem 3.11, then project onto the constraint set using
Algorithm 1. We assume WTW has been precomputed, and
note that the per-iteration time complexity only depends on
WTW through its size, and not its contents. We therefore
use the n× n identity matrix for W. Additionally, we let Q
be a random 4n×n strategy matrix. In Figure 3c, we report
the per-iteration time required for increasing domain sizes,
averaged over 15 iterations. As we can see, optimization
scales up to domains as large as n = 4096, where it takes
about 139 seconds per iteration. While expensive, it is not
unreasonable to run for a few hundred iterations in this case,
and is an impressive scalability result given that there are
over 67 million optimization variables when n is that large.
Additionally, we note that strategy optimization is a one-time
cost, and it can be done offline before deploying the mecha-
nism to the users. Furthermore, as we showed in Section 6.3,
the number of samples required typically increases with the
domain size, so there is good reason to run mechanisms on
small domains whenever possible, compressing it if necessary.
In general, the plot shows that the time grows roughly at a
O(n3) rate, as it took about 19 seconds for n = 2048 and
2.5 seconds for n = 1024, confirming the theoretical time
complexity analysis.
6.7 Non-negativity and consistency
We now experimentally evaluate the extension we pro-
posed in Remark 1, which we call workload non-negative
least squares (WNNLS). The full details are described in
Appendix A. For this experiment, we fix  = 1.0, N = 103,
and n = 512, and use a random sample of data from the
“HEPTH” dataset obtained from the DPBench study [22],
but note that results on other datasets were similar. With
this extension, we no longer have a closed form expression for
variance, so we run 100 simulations to estimate it instead.
Figure 4 shows the (normalized) variance of the mecha-
nism on this dataset with and without the extension. As
we can see, the extension reduces the variance in all cases,
and the improvement ranges from 1.96 to 5.6, which is a sig-
nificant amount. In general, the magnitude of improvement
depends on factors like  and N , which are not varied here.
When N and  are sufficiently large, the default workload
query estimates will already be non-negative, in which case
WNNLS would offer no improvement. WNNLS offers sig-
nificant improvement for many practical  and N , however.
Additionally, we note that this extension can be plugged into
any of the other competing mechanisms as well, and offers
similar utility improvements.
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7. RELATEDWORK
The mechanism we propose in this work is related to a
large body of research in both the central and local model
of differential privacy.
Answering linear queries under central differential privacy
is a widely studied topic [3, 30, 33, 8, 28]. Many state-of-the-
art mechanisms for this task, like the Matrix Mechanism [27],
achieve privacy by adding Laplace or Gaussian noise to a
carefully selected set of “strategy queries”. This query strat-
egy is tailored to the workload, and can even be optimized
for it, as the Matrix Mechanism does. The optimization
problem posed by the Matrix Mechanism has been studied
theoretically [27, 29], and several algorithms have been pro-
posed to solve it or approximately solve it [47, 28, 46, 33].
While similar in spirit to our mechanism, the optimization
problem underlying the Matrix Mechanism is substantially
different from ours, as it requires search over a different space
of mechanisms tailored to central differential privacy. For
both optimization problems, the optimization variable is a so-
called “strategy matrix”, but these represent fundamentally
different things in each mechanism, and hence the constraints
on the strategy matrix differ. For the Matrix Mechanism,
the strategy matrix encodes a set of linear queries which will
be answered with a noise-addition mechanism. In contrast,
the strategy matrix for our mechanism encodes a conditional
probability distribution.
Answering linear queries under local differential privacy
has received less attention, but one notable idea is to directly
apply mechanisms from central differential privacy to the
local model. This translation can be achieved by simply
executing the mechanism independently for each single-user
database, then aggregating the results. This approach has
been studied theoretically with the Gaussian mechanism [4]
and the Matrix Mechanism [17]. While these mechanisms
trivially provide privacy, they tend to have poor utility in
practice, as they are not tailored to the local model. Another
notable approach for this task casts it as a mean estimation
problem, and uses LDP mechanisms designed for that [9].
These works provide a thorough theoretical treatment of this
problem, showing bounds on achieved error, but no practical
implementation or evaluation.
More work has been done to answer specific, fixed work-
loads of general interest, such as histograms [1, 45, 41, 44, 18,
25, 6, 40], range queries [13, 42], and marginals [12, 42]. A
very nice summary of the computational complexity, sample
complexity and communication complexity for the mecha-
nisms designed for the Histogram workload is given in [1].
Interestingly, even for the very simple Histogram workload,
there are multiple mechanisms because the optimal mech-
anism is not clear. This is in stark contrast to the central
model of differential privacy, where, for the Histogram work-
load it is clear that the optimal strategy is the workload
itself. Almost all of these mechanisms are instances of the
general class of mechanisms we consider in Definition 3.2,
just with different workload factorizations. The strategy ma-
trices for these workloads were all carefully designed to offer
low error on the workloads they were designed for, by ex-
ploiting knowledge about those specific workloads. However,
none of these mechanisms perform optimization to choose
the strategy matrix, instead it is fixed in advance.
Kairouz et al. propose an optimization-based approach to
mechanism design as well [26]. The mechanism they propose
is not designed to estimate histograms or workload queries,
but for other statistical tasks, namely hypothesis testing
and something they call information preservation. They also
consider the class of mechanisms characterized by a strat-
egy matrix (Proposition 2.6), and propose an optimization
problem over this space to maximize utility for a given task.
Moreover, for convex and sublinear utility functions, they
show that the optimal mechanism is a so-called extremal
mechanism, and state a linear program to find this optimal
mechanism. Unfortunately, there are 2n optimization vari-
ables in this linear program, making it infeasible to solve in
practice. Furthermore, the restriction on the utility function
(sublinear, convex) prevents the technique from applying to
our setting.
8. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new LDP mechanism that adapts to a
workload of linear queries provided by an analyst. We for-
mulated this as a constrained optimization problem over an
expressive class of unbiased LDP mechanisms and proposed
a projected gradient descent algorithm to solve this problem.
We showed experimentally that our mechanism outperforms
all other existing LDP mechanisms in a variety of settings,
even outperforming mechanisms on the workloads for which
they were intended.
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APPENDIX
Symbol Meaning
n domain size
N number of users
 privacy budget
M privacy mechanism
U set of possible users, |U| = n
O set of possible outcomes, |O| = m
W p× n workload matrix
Q m× n strategy matrix
V p×m reconstruction matrix
x data vector
y response vector, y =MQ(x)
1 vector of ones
DQ Diag(Q1)
Q† pseudo-inverse
qu u
th column of Q
vi i
th row of V
tr[·] trace of a matrix
Lworst(V,Q) worst-case variance
Lavg(V,Q) average-case variance
L(V,Q) optimization objective
L(Q) optimization objective for Q
Diag(·) diagonal matrix from vector
Table 2: Notation
A. NON-NEGATIVITY & CONSISTENCY
In this section, we describe and evaluate a simple exten-
sion to our mechanism that can greatly improve its utility in
practice. While our basic mechanism offers unbiased answers
to the workload queries, this can come at the cost of certain
anomalies. For example, the estimated answer to a workload
query might be negative, even though the true answer could
never be negative. This motivates us to consider an exten-
sion where we try to account for the structural constraints
we know about data vector. Specifically, we propose the
following non-negative least squares problem to find a non-
negative (feasible) xˆ such that Wxˆ is as close as possible to
our unbiased estimate Vy. The problem at hand is:
xˆ = arg min
x≥0
‖Wx−Vy‖22
Once xˆ is obtained, the workload answers can be estimated
by computing Wxˆ. While this estimate is not necessarily
unbiased, it often has substantially lower variance than Vy
and can be a worthwhile trade-off, particularly in the high-
privacy/low-data regime where non-negativity is a bigger
issue. A similar problem was studied theoretically by Nikolov
et al. [35] and empirically by Li et al. [30] in the central
model of differential privacy, where it has been shown to offer
significant utility improvements. There are various python
implementations to solve the above problem efficiently [39,
48, 34]. We simply use the limited memory BFGS algorithm
from scipy to solve it [31, 39].
B. MISSING PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 3.4. We begin by deriving the vari-
ance for a single query vTy (where y =MQ(x)). Note that
y is a sum of multinomial random variables su instantiated
with parameters n = xu and p = qu, where su is the response
vector for all users of type u. Using the well-known formula
for the covariance of a multinomial random variable, the
covariance of a sum, and the variance of a linear combination
of correlated random variables, we obtain:
Cov[su] = xu(Diag(qu)− quqTu )
Cov[y] =
∑
u
xu(Diag(qu)− quqTu )
Var[vTy] = vTCov[y]v
=
∑
u
xu(v
TDiag(qu)v − vTquqTuv)
=
∑
u
xu(v
TDiag(qu)v − (vTqu)2)
The total variance is obtained by summing over all the rows
of V. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.9. We prove the claim by showing
the two objectives are the same up to constant additive and
multiplicative factors.
Lavg(V,Q) ∝
∑
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − (vTi qu)2
=
∑
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − ‖VQ‖2F
=
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag
(∑
u
qu
)
vi − ‖W‖2F
= tr[VDQV
T ]− ‖W‖2F
Since W is constant, we can drop that term for the pur-
poses of defining the objective function. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.10. Observe that we can construct
V one row at a time because there are no interaction terms
between vi and vj for i 6= j in the objective function. Fur-
thermore, we can optimize vi through the following quadratic
program.
minimize
vi
vTi DQvi
subject to QTvi = wi
The above problem is closely related to a standard norm
minimization problem, and can be transformed to one by
making the substitution ui = D
1
2
Qvi. The problem becomes:
minimize
ui
‖ui‖22
subject to (QTD
− 1
2
Q )ui = wi
This unique solution to this problem is given by ui =
(QTD
− 1
2
Q )
†wi [10]. Using the Hermitian reduction identity
[7] X† = XT (XXT )†, we have:
vi = D
− 1
2
Q ui
= D
− 1
2
Q (Q
TD
− 1
2
Q )
†wi
= D
− 1
2
Q D
− 1
2
Q Q(Q
TD
− 1
2
Q D
− 1
2
Q Q)
†wi
= D−1Q Q(Q
TD−1Q Q)
†wi
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Applying this for all i, we arrive at the desired solution.
V = W(QTD−1Q Q)
†QTD−1Q
Proof of Theorem 3.11. We plug in the optimal solu-
tion for V as given in Theorem 3.10 and simplify using linear
algebra identities and the cyclic permutation property of
trace.
L(Q) , min
V
L(V,Q)
= tr[W(QTD−1Q Q)
†QTD−1Q DQD
−1
Q Q(Q
TD−1Q Q)
†WT ]
= tr[W(QTD−1Q Q)
†(QTD−1Q Q)(Q
TD−1Q Q)
†WT ]
= tr[W(QTD−1Q Q)
†WT ]
= tr[(QTD−1Q Q)
†(WTW)]
Proof of Theorem 5.1. It is obvious that the worst-
case variance is greater than (or equal to) the average-case
variance. We will now bound the worst-case variance from
above. Using u∗ to denote the worst-case user, we have the
following upper bound on worst-case variance:
Lworst(V,Q)
=N max
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − (vTi qu)2
(a)
≤N
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu∗)vi
=
N
n
∑
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu∗)vi
(b)
≤ e
N
n
∑
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi
(c)
=e
(N
n
∑
u∈U
p∑
i=1
vTi Diag(qu)vi − (vTi qu)2
)
+
eN
n
‖W‖2F
=e
(
Lavg(V,Q) +
N
n
||W||2F
)
In step (a), we use the fact that (vTi qu)
2 is non-negative.
In step (b), we apply the fact that qu∗ ≤ exp ()qu for all u.
In step (c), we express the bound in terms of Lavg, adding 0
in the form of ‖W‖2F −
∑
u
∑
i(v
T
i qu)
2. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. Consider the following optimiza-
tion problem which is closely related to Problem 3.12.
minimize
X0
tr[X−1(WTW)]
subject to Xuu ≤ 1
Li et al. derived the SVD bound, which shows the minimum
above is at least 1
n
(λ1 + · · ·+ λn)2 [29]. See also [46]. Fur-
thermore, if X∗ is the optimal solution and the constraint
is replaced with Xuu ≤ c then cX∗ remains optimal [30], in
which case the bound becomes 1
nc
(λ1 + · · ·+ λn)2.
We will now argue that any feasible solution to our problem
can be directly transformed into a feasible solution of the
above related problem. Suppose Q is a feasible solution
to Problem 3.12 and let X = QTD−1Q Q. Note that the
objective functions are identical now. We will argue that
Xuu ≤ exp ()n .
Xuu =
∑
o
Q2ou
1∑
u′ Qou
≤
∑
o
Q2ou
exp ()
nQou
=
exp ()
n
∑
o
Qou
=
exp ()
n
Thus, we have shown that any solution to Problem 3.12 gives
rise to a corresponding solution to the above problem. Thus,
the SVD Bound applies and we arrive at the desired result:
1
exp ()
(λ1 + · · ·+ λn)2 ≤ L(Q)
Proof of Corollary 5.7.
Lworst(V,Q) ≥ Lavg(V,Q)
=
N
n
[
L(V,Q)− ‖W‖2F
]
≥ N
n
[
L(Q)− ‖W‖2F
]
≥ N
n
[ 1
exp ()
(λ1 + · · ·+ λn)2 − ‖W‖2F
]
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